The series of contempt citations in Congress’s investigations in aid of legislation has brought renewed energy and drama to what are typically dry deliberations on national issues.
Among these is the case of Katherine Cassandra Li Ong, whose arrest and detention under a contempt order issued by the House of Representatives in connection with its inquiry into alleged illegal Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs) drew intense public attention and debate over the limits of Congress’s investigative powers.
In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court (SC) dismissed the petition filed by Ong, which sought judicial intervention to restrain the Senate and House committees from violating her constitutional rights in the conduct of their inquiries in aid of legislation, alleging that the proceedings and contempt orders infringed upon her rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination, and to counsel.
The Court stressed that while Congress has the authority to conduct inquiries and cite individuals in contempt as part of its legislative functions, these powers are not unlimited and must be exercised within constitutional bounds.
However, the SC dismissed Ong’s petition for certiorari and prohibition, denying her plea for injunctive relief after finding that she failed to justify direct resort to the Court and to identify specific acts or questions that infringed upon her rights.
In rejecting Ong’s petition, did the Court make a definitive finding that her rights were not violated, as claimed in a news report stating: “…the Court ruled that Ong’s constitutional rights were not violated, rejecting her claim that the legislative hearings subjected her to self-incrimination”?
To better understand the Court’s ruling, it is necessary to examine how it addressed each of Ong’s key arguments relating to Congress’s powers and her invoked constitutional rights.
On congressional power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation
Ong argued that both the Senate Tricomm and the House Quadcomm exceeded their authority in conducting inquiries that, she claimed, were punitive and inquisitorial rather than legislative. She alleged that the questions asked went beyond the purpose of crafting laws and instead sought to incriminate her.
The Senate and House panels maintained that their investigations were valid exercises of Congress’s power under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution. They asserted that the hearings were conducted pursuant to duly published rules and in connection with legitimate legislative concerns, including human trafficking and illegal POGO operations.
The Court affirmed that the Legislature’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation “has consistently been affirmed” and “encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.”
It emphasized, however, that such power is subject to three limits:
1. The inquiry must be in aid of legislation;
2. It must follow duly published rules of procedure; and
3. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries must be respected.
On congressional power of contempt
Ong questioned the authority of Congress to order her arrest and detention for contempt, claiming it violated her constitutional rights and amounted to an abuse of legislative power.
The House Quadcomm, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the power to cite and detain for contempt is inherent in the legislature’s authority to conduct investigations. They stressed that such power is essential to compel attendance, ensure truthful testimony, and uphold the integrity of the proceedings.
The SC upheld the implicit power of Congress to cite individuals in contempt and even to order arrest if necessary to enforce attendance or testimony, calling it “an inherent power that arises by implication in order to allow the legislature to perform its duties effectively.”
On the right to counsel
Ong alleged that she was deprived of her right to counsel when she was separated from her lawyer during the hearings and when her counsel was warned against assisting her while she invoked her rights.
Both the Senate and House panels contended that the right to counsel applies only to custodial investigations in criminal proceedings, not to legislative inquiries. They added that Ong’s counsel was allowed to remain in the hearing room and was not removed.
The Court agreed with the respondents, ruling that “the right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime.” Legislative inquiries, the Court explained, are not criminal proceedings; hence, Ong could not invoke this right in that context.
On the right to remain silent
Ong invoked her right to remain silent, arguing that the questions asked during the hearings were incriminating and that she should not have been compelled to answer them.
The Senate and House committees countered that Ong could not invoke a blanket right to silence in a legislative inquiry. They argued that she must attend and answer questions unless a specific question would directly incriminate her.
The SC held that Ong’s blanket invocation of the right to remain silent was misplaced. The Court reiterated that this right “may be invoked only when an incriminating question is being asked, since [a witness has] no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions.” Thus, the right does not justify total refusal to testify in a legislative inquiry.
On the right against self-incrimination
Ong claimed that the questions asked of her in the hearings sought to elicit self-incriminating statements, violating her constitutional right under Article III, Section 17.
The respondents asserted that Ong was merely a resource person or witness, not an accused in any criminal proceeding. As such, she could not refuse to appear altogether but could invoke the right only in response to specific questions that would directly incriminate her.
The Court agreed with the respondents, citing Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks (2007), where it ruled that witnesses in legislative inquiries are not criminally accused and may only invoke the right against self-incrimination when a particular question is incriminating. Ong, the Court noted, failed to identify any such specific question.
Implications of the SC ruling
Contrary to how some news reports framed the decision, the SC did not rule that Congress’s power of legislative inquiry and contempt trumps a petitioner’s right to self-incrimination. Instead, it clarified that both powers and rights coexist within constitutional limits.
While reaffirming that Congress may compel attendance and testimony through its inherent contempt power, the Court emphasized that such authority must be exercised “in aid of legislation” and with due regard for the rights of persons appearing before it.
The justices found no sufficient basis to determine whether Ong’s rights were actually violated, noting that she failed to identify any specific incriminating question or act to support her claim.
Thus, the decision did not elevate legislative power above constitutional protection; it merely declined to rule on alleged violations that were not factually established.
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